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The G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project aimed at revising existing tax 
rules to align the taxation of profit with the location of economic activities and value creation (the 
“value creation principle”). It has received much commentary in literature and general debates1 
and has been regarded as “the most significant re-write of the international tax rules in a century”,2 
an opportunity to “rebuild a healthy scheme for allocating taxation rights”,3 having the potential 
to significantly alter the contours of the international tax regime,4 transforming the international 
tax regime, 5  signaling a “new struggle over international taxation”, 6  or representing the 
“emergence of a new international tax regime”. 7  The OECD claimed that the revised rules 
represent “the first substantial – and overdue - renovation of the international tax standards in 
almost a century”.8   
In this paper, we suggest that the ambitious BEPS Project9 represents a shift from a bilateral system 
to a multilateral global system of taxing multinational enterprises (MNEs). We further argue that 
the misconceived and controversial “value creation principle” may have a fighting chance of being 
the basis for the global tax system in the 21st Century. We propose a global profit split approach 
allocating MNEs’ global profits to countries where value is created and explain the pros and cons 
of this proposal. 
The scope of this paper is limited to the impact of the BEPS project on the allocation of MNEs’s 
global profits among countries for tax purposes. It does not consider the general corporate tax 
issues, such as tax rate and integration of corporate tax and personal income tax, which, we believe, 
will continue to be defined by domestic fiscal policies. It also does not dwell into the jurisdictional 
nexus issue, even though the tax presence (physical, economic or digital) of an MNE in a country 
can be unclear in some cases, such as digital businesses. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Following the Introduction, Part 2 provides an overview 
of the BEPS Project and signs of shifting international tax paradigm towards a global approach. 
Part 3 discusses the value creation principle and its implications for the emerging global tax 
approach. Part 4 proposes a global profit split approach to allocating MNEs’ global profits and 
compares it to other proposals. It makes the case that the global profit split approach can be 
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designed to reflect the value creation principle, although significant challenges exist, and has a 
chance of being implemented by countries in the 21st century. 
2 THE BEPS PROJECT AND SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL TAX PARADIGM   
2.1 Overview  
The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project began in July 2013 when OECD and G20 
countries agreed on the need for multilateral efforts to tackle the problem of BEPS.10 “BEPS refers 
to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits 
to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity.”11  BEPS is problematic 
from the perspective of G20 and OECD countries because it causes the loss of tax revenue,12  
“undermines the fairness and integrity of tax systems” and undermines “voluntary compliance by 
all taxpayers”.13 Addressing the BEPS problem and “ensuring that all taxpayers pay their fair share 
of taxes is more than ever a priority” in those countries in the context of  “severe fiscal 
consolidation and social hardship” following the 2008 global financial crisis.14 In other words, 
tackling BEPS practices of MNEs was politically and fiscally important.    
The root cause of the BEPS problem was diagnosed to be the defective tax rules (such as gaps and 
mismatches in international tax rules in different countries) which allow MNEs to legally but 
artificially shift profits to low or no-tax jurisdictions where the business has little or no economic 
activity.  Since the issues lie with the tax rules themselves and the goal of the BEPS Project is to 
“revise the rules to align them to developments in the world economy, and ensure that profits are 
taxed where economic activities are carried out and value is created.”15 We suggest below that 
these rewritten rules signal a shift away from the existing bilateral international tax regime to a 
multilateral global regime of taxing MNEs.  
2.2 Existing International Tax Paradigm 
Under the existing international tax regime, an MNE is generally liable to tax in each country in 
which it has a business presence in the form of a local company or permanent establishment. The 
governing tax laws are domestic laws and bilateral tax treaties. International tax rules in domestic 
laws generally impose tax on a company that is a member of a MNE group on the basis of the 
company’s domestic residence or domestic source of income. For example, under the Canadian 
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Income Tax Act 16  (ITA), a resident company 17  is taxable on its worldwide income under 
subsections 2(1) and (2) and section 3, while a non-resident company is taxable on its Canadian 
source income, such as carrying on business in Canada, realizing capital gains from disposition of 
taxable Canadian property or receiving interest, rent, royalty or dividends from a Canadian resident 
payer.18 Section 247 contains transfer pricing rules to, in effect, test the price of related-party 
transactions against the arm’s length principle. Bilateral tax treaties typically follow the OECD 
Model Convention19 and/or the UN Model Convention20 and allocate taxing rights between the 
two countries on the basis of residence and/or source of income. Tax treaties also authorize the tax 
authorities to adjust the profits of an associated enterprise in accordance with the arm’s length 
principle. 
Even though the residence-source paradigm and the arm’s length principle are found in the 
domestic law of many countries, the detailed rules to determine residence, source of income, the 
amount of profit for tax purposes tend to differ from country to country. Even the transfer pricing 
rules that tend to be informed by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are implemented 
differently across countries. Tax treaties “bridge” the two countries’ tax systems in order to prevent 
double taxation, tax evasion or tax avoidance, but they do not require the domestic laws be 
coordinated or “synchronized”.  As such, there are gaps, overlaps and mismatches between 
domestic tax laws. Furthermore, because tax law generally defers to private law for determining 
the nature of transactions and private laws may differ from country to country, divergence in 
private laws also results in divergence of tax laws.  For example, a financing transaction may be 
treated as debt in one country, but equity in another. 
While the business of MNEs is global, tax-related information about the global business is not 
available to the tax authorities of any given country. Under the laws of a specific country, the 
obligation to file tax returns is limited to taxpayers, which are local subsidiaries or non-resident 
companies with a permanent establishment. For example, under the Canadian ITA, the tax 
reporting obligation falls on taxpayers that are liable to Part I tax (i.e. resident companies or non-
resident companies carrying on business in Canada). The Canadian subsidiary of a foreign-based 
MNE is not required to report on the global income of the MNE group. As such, each country in 
which the MNE operates has partial information about the MNE’s business. There is asymetry in 
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tax information between MNEs and the tax authority of a country, and a serious issue of “endemic 
and worrying lack in data and information”.21 
Taxpayers have the right to engage in tax planning and minimize their taxes. Legal fictions and 
legal arrangements are generally respected by tax laws; they are “ignored” or “looked through” for 
tax purposes only in specific circumstances. Meanwhile, countries engage in tax competition in 
order to attract investment by MNEs. Some countries do not even impose corporate income tax 
and function as “tax havens”. Through tax planning strategies such as debt financing, transfer 
pricing, tax arbitrage and treaty shopping, an MNE can shift profits earned in production countries 
or market countries to entites located in tax havens where the MNE has little or no economic 
activity.     
The existing international tax regime was created almost 100 years ago. It has evolved somewhat 
in technical details, but the residence-source paradigm has remained the same. Each country seeks 
to determine the amount of taxable income of a member of an MNE group by reference to 
observable evidence or activities and adheres to the principle of taxing each company as a separate 
enity and then rely on the arm’s length principle to prevent income shifiting by members of an 
MNE group. Meanwhile, the business of MNEs has become global in nature and more reliant on 
intangible property and technology. Globalisation and digitation have exacerbated the impact of 
gaps and frictions among different countries’ tax systems. The “web” of national tax laws 
encountered by an MNE has serious holes and gaps to allow its income to find its way to a tax 
haven.   
2.3 Revisions by the BEPS Project  
The G20 and OECD member countries represent the world’s largest economies and suffer the most 
from MNEs’ tax planning practices. Since neither the G20 or OECD has any tax law-making power 
and cannot actually rewrite any tax rules directly, the BEPS Project developed measures for 
countries to incorporate into their laws or tax treaties.22  
The OECD Action Plan on BEPS (2013)23 identified 15 actions to address the root cause of BEPS 
by: introducing coherence in the domestic rules; reinforcing substance requirements in the existing 
international standards; improving information reporting and transparency; and introducing a 
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multilateral instrument.24 The final reports on these actions contain recommendations, which take 
the form of minimum standards to be enacted into domestic law,25 updated standards,26 common 
approaches27 or best practices,28 depending on the level of consensus reached.29 
To improve coherency, common approaches are recommended to deal with hybrid mismatch 
arrangements and interest deductibility. In the case of hybrid arrangements, for example, the 
approach is to eliminate gaps or mismatch by linking the domestic rules of different countries.30 
In the case of interest deductibility, the recommended approach is based on a fixed ratio rule which 
limits an entity’s net deductions for interest and payments economically equivalent to interest to a 
percentage of its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). The 
recommended corridors of possible ratios is 10% and 30%.31  
The substance of taxpayers’ activities (as opposed to legal form or legal arrangements) is 
emphasized in Actions 8-10 Report titled “Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value 
Creation”. Recognizing that the arm’s length principle is the cornerstone of transfer pricing rules 
and the existing guidance on the application of the principle has proven vulnerable to manipulation, 
the revised rules aim to “secure outcomes that see operational profits allocated to the economic 
activities which generate them”.32 They authorise the disregarding of the transactions between 
associated enterprises that lack commercial rationality and emphasize that the allocation of profits 
to risks and intangibles be based on substantive contributions in fact as opposed to contractual 
allocation of risks or mere legal ownership of intangibles.33 
To address the tax information problem, a minimum standard on country-by-country reporting 
(CbCR) was introduced in Action 13.  Under the CbCR standard, a MNE must fill out a master 
file (on a template prepared by the OECD) and files it with the country where its head office is 
based. The template includes information on the structure of the MNE group, the global value 
chains and payments made by members of the group to each other. The reporting also covers 
information on revenue, profit, tax paid, stated capital, accumulated earnings, number of 
employees and tangible assets as well as the company’s overall strategy for the development, 
ownership and exploitation of intangibles. The master file received by the country where the head 
office is based is then shared with the tax authorities of the countries where the MNE has 
operations.   
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To reduce gaps and frictions among different tax systems which are coordinated through several 
thousands of bilateral tax treaties, Action 15 of the BEPS Project recommended a multilateral 
mechanism for speedy amendment of existing bilateral tax treaties.34 A Multilateral Convention 
to Implement the Tax Treaty Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“Multilateral 
Instrument” or “MLI”) was developed and has now be signed by over 86 countries,35 including 
Canada.  Pursuant to the MLI, Canada is able to modify its current tax treaties with countries which 
have also signed the MLI. The MLI includes a minimum standard on preventing treaty abuse and 
another minimum standard on resolving tax disputes through the mutual agreement procedure.  
G20 Leaders endorsed the BEPS recommendations and strongly urged “the timely implementation 
of the project and encourage all countries and jurisdictions, including developing ones, to 
participate”.36 An inclusive framework was developed in 2016 to monitor the implementation of 
BEPS measures globally,37 and had over 130 countries participating by the end of December 2018.  
A global Platform for Collaboration on Tax was launched in April 2016 by the International 
Monetary Fund, OECD, United Nations and World Bank Group to provide technical assistance to 
interested developing economies.  
2.4 Emerging Shift of the International Tax Paradigm 
The BEPS Project signals a shift away from the existing bilateral regime of residence-source based 
taxation towards a multilateral regime of value-creation based taxation. Such shift is by no means 
clear or controversy-free. After highlighting the signs of such shift, this section points out the 
controversies and challenges.  
2.4.1 Signs of shift 
Signs of shift include the standard-setting institutions and processes, the adoption of the value 
creation principle, recognizing the global nature of MNEs’ businesses, introducing a global 
standard for tax reporting by MNEs and information sharing by governments, establishing a global 
monitoring mechanism for implementation, and introducing a multilateral legal instrument that 
affects or backstop the distribution of taxing powers among countries.   
“For the first time all OECD and G20 countries have worked together on an equal footing to design 
common responses to international tax challenges.”38 In the past, international tax standards (or 
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soft law) had been developed by the OECD and developed countries. The BEPS project involved 
more countries (notably emerging countries such as China, India, Russia, etc.) and international 
organizations, including the African Tax Administration Forum, IMF, the World Bank and the 
United Nations.  The problems of BEPS were considered “global” in nature and BEPS Project 
sought to avoid having competing sets of international standards which could lead to “global tax 
chaos”.39  
The BEPS Project took a more “global” view of MNEs and emphasized taxing MNEs in 
accordance with the value creation principle. In effect, this approach renders the existing 
residence-source paradigm virtually irrelevant to taxing MNEs. For example, BEPS Action 4 
(interest deduction) Action 13 (CbCR) and Actions 8-10 (transfer pricing) provide signals of 
treating MNEs as global firms. The EBITSA or EBIT rule in Action 4 takes into account the 
worldwide MNE group’s interest-to-EBITDA ratio. The CbCR requires the filing of a “master 
file” which contains information on the MNE group. Profit split methods under the updated 
trahsfer pricing rules take into account of a MNE’s global value chain analysis.  
Bilateral tax treaties are being amended through a multilateral legally-binding instrument. So, tax 
rules in both domestic law and tax treaties are now more global. Tax administrations have access 
to tax information through a global mechanism.40 
The BEPS Project and related initiatives, such as the common reporting standard and global 
information sharing platforms increased the legal obligation of MNEs to report tax information 
and the capacity of tax authorities to obtain information.  The Inclusive Framework has some 
promise of actually ensuring “widespread and consistent implementation” of new international tax 
standards.41  
Overall, the BEPS Project is signaling a shift towards a global approach for taxing MNEs. Such 
shift was an reaction to the tax problems arising from global financial crisis and fundamental 
challenges posted by globalization and digitation to the existing international tax regime created 
for an industrial, physical economy. The shift amplified by the BEPS, but there were earlier 
undercurrents of shifting.   
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2.4.2 Evolutionary Nature of the shift  
Recent shift away from the traditional international tax paradigm was motivated by addressing the 
fundamental mismatch between the paradgim and the new realities of a global digital economy, 
the rise of MNEs, and the global power shifts away from the United States and the OECD.   
The OECD has been the main caretaker of international tax standards and a “global tax 
policeman” 42  in recent decades. For example, the OECD Model Tax Convention and 
Commentaries as well as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are important sources of “soft 
law”. To minimize the negative effects of harmful tax competition, which was regarded as an 
“emerging global issue” in the 1990s43 the OECD launched an initiative in 1998 to establish a 
multilateral approach to tackle this issue so that countries could operate individually and 
collectively to limit the extent of these harmful practices. The OECD also led initiatives in tackling 
the tax challenges of e-commerce and digital businesses and creating the Global Forum on 
transparency and exchange of information for taxation.44 The shifting of global geopolitical power 
towards the G20 brings with it the shifting of power in setting international tax standards. As a 
group, non-OECD members of the G20 have different preferences about how the international tax 
system should be reshaped as the existing system better serves the interests of OECD countries.45  
The rise of MNEs and the perception of lack of fairness in the existing system of taxing MNEs 
goes beyond the allocating of taxing rights between countries. At taxpayers’ level, the ability of 
MNEs to minimize their taxes was perceived to be unfair, resulting in erosion of public confidence 
in the tax system. Further, corporate income tax has at least two important functions in democratic 
countries: it raises revenue to finance public spending, including social programs; it backstops 
progressive personal income tax to ensure progressive taxation, which is the main means of 
redistributing social income. Therefore, corporate tax avoidance weakens these two functions and  
has a direct impact on welfare of citizens. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis helped exposing the 
link between tax avoidance and social welfare. The public exerted political pressure on 
governments to prevent erosion of their welfare by MNEs.  
At a technical level, through the efforts of the OECD and the United Nations, transfer pricing rules 
have evolved towards more substance-based analysis in recent years and developing countries 
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have demanded more source-based taxing rights. The most recent example of the latter is the new 
provision on service fees in Article 12A of the UN Model Convention.46 
2.4.3 Unilateralism in action and challenges ahead  
The signals of shift towards a global approach to taxing MNEs are by no means universal. In fact, 
judging by the actions taken by some countries, unilateralism is very much at play.  It is true than 
many BEPS recommendations have been implemented by many countries. For example,  over 100 
countries (including most EU patent box countries47) have committed to implementing BEPS 
Action 5 (Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking Into Account Transparency 
and Substance). Of the 175 preferential tax regimes reviewed by the Forum on Harmful Tax 
Practices, 31 regimes have been changed; 81 regimes require legislative changes which are in 
progress; 47 regimes have been determined to not pose a BEPS risk; 4 have harmful or potentially 
harmful features and 12 regimes are still under review.48  
However, implementation of other BEPS Measures varies greatly. Some OECD countries which 
suffer from sophisticated tax planning using hybrid instruments or entities or financing 
transactions have implemented the common approaches recommended in Action 2 and Action 4.  
Examples are the adopt of EBITDA in the EU, USA, Australia, and South Africa, and hybrid rules 
in Australia, France, Germany and UK.49 In the case of developing countries, implementation is 
more limited, for several possible reasons. The BEPS Measures were not designed to deal with the 
issues faced by developing countries,50 even though substantial efforts were made to take the 
viewpoints of developing countries into account by the BEPS Project. Developing countries are 
primarily concerned with the erosion of source-based taxation (through transfer pricing, avoidance 
of permanent establishment status, or treaty shopping and avoidance of taxation of service fees or 
capital gains of non-residents from offshore indirect sales). They also have limited capacity to 
respond to BEPS problems.51 Not surprisingly, developing countries have generally chosen to 
implement Actions 8-10 and 13 on transfer pricing.52  
Meanwhile, unilateral actions have been taken by countries in the name of combatting BEPS. 
Some are legislative, including the diverted profit tax in the United Kingdom and Australia,53 
GILTI rules in the United States,54 equalization levy in India, digital services tax in the UK. 55 Tax 
auditors in many countries have been reportedly emboldened by the BEPS Project and taken an 
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aggressive stance against foreign MNEs. For example, the number of tax controversies has risen 
in Asia and other countries.56   
The difficulties facing a shift to a global approach to taxing MNEs are evident in the process of 
developing consensus in taxing digital businesses. The BEPS Project did not contain a final report 
on Action 1 regarding digital economy. There are ongoing concerns around the ability of the 
existing tax rules (including the revised rules) to meet the needs of a rapidly digitalising economy. 
At the request of the G20 Finance Ministers, the Inclusive Framework issued the “Interim Report 
on the Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation” in March 2018. The Interim Report57 still 
contains no consensus-based measures to tackle the broader tax issues, after analyzing a number 
of options, including some domestic legislative measures. According to the report, there was no 
consensus on whether new rules are needed and if so, whether the new rules should apply only to 
digital businesses (ring-fencing). There was also no consensus on whether users create value and 
if so, how much value is created. Work continues towards a consensus-based, global solution by 
2020.58  
3 THE VALUE CREATION PRINCIPLE  
A paradigm shift towards a global approach to taxing MNEs faces many challenges, including 
political, institutional, legal and administrative challenges. A unifying principle to guide the 
allocation of taxing rights over MNEs’ global profits would be critical. Is the value creation 
principle such a principle? In this section, we briefly discuss the meaning, scope and role of this 
principle.   
3.1 The Principle and Its Ambiguities  
The BEPS Project’s stated goal to “revise the rules to align them to developments in the world 
economy, and ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities are carried out and value is 
created”59 has been regarded as introducing the value creation principle.60  “The ascendency of the 
value creation principle has been remarkable, as has its influence.”61 However, the BEPS Project 




3.1.1 Where does the principle come from? 
The notion of “value creation” itself is “new” in international tax discussions, except in regard to 
transfer pricing issues associated with intangibles. There is no single provision in the OECD Model 
Convention and existing tax treaties that can be identified as referencing, explicitly or implicitly, 
to value creation. Similarly, there is no existing international tax provisions in the Canadian 
Income Tax Act that refers to value creation.  
The existing international tax system distributes taxing rights between countries on the basis of 
residence and source. Neither residence or source is explicitly linked to the place of value creation, 
although they might be originally used as proxies for measuring the “ability to pay” or the host 
country’s “contribution” to the corporate taxpayer’s income-earnign activities.62  
There is no clear theoretical underpinning of the value creation principle. The BEPS Project does 
not reject the theories that support the existing system, that is, the economic allegiance theory, the 
benefit theory, the neutrality theory.63 Therefore, the value creation principle could be viewed as 
a new interpretation of existing theories. This is perhaps most obvious in the debates about taxing 
digital businesses. For example, the UK government views the participation and engagement of 
users as an important aspect of value creation for digital business, and the location of users in the 
UK could be read as that the non-resident digital business companies owe “economic allegiance” 
to UK as they derive benefits from the infrastructure provided by the UK.64  
3.1.2 What creates value? 
What creates value for tax purposes? Some clues may be gleaned from the BEPS reports. For 
example, the reports on digital economy mention user and/or customers as potential value drivers 
in digital businesses.  The Master (global) File and Local (country) file required by the CbCR 
reporting 65  mention important drivers of business profit, such as key functions performed, 
important risks assumed, and important assets used, for the development, ownership and 
exploitation of intangibles, central financing function for the group.66  
The BEPS Project seems to suggest that the notion of value creation refers to the value or profit 
generated by the activities of a MNE group (that is, the supply side).67 Financial accounting data 
for the MNE group and a local entity is an important source of information for determining profits. 
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However, in allocating the group profit to a specific country, “demand side” factors, such as “local 
market features”, including location savings and consumer preferences or market premium, can be 
relevant factors in comparability analysis and splitting residual profit of the group. 68  Some 
commentators suggest, however, that value realization through sales or marketization of goods and 
services also create value.69 
3.1.3 Does the principle function as a source rule?   
There are concerns about establishing rules to implement the value creation principle.70 Can it 
become a source rule? The debates about digital taxation seem to suggest that the principle can be 
a source rule to justify the taxation of remote digital businesses on the basis of a digital presence. 
Since the BEPS Project does not elaborate what the “base” in “base erosion and profit shifting” is 
and invokes anti-avoidance rules to protect the tax base, it can be assumed that BEPS Project 
regarded the value creation principle as the basis for establishing the existing tax base. This is 
consistent with the rewriting objective of the BEPS project. In this sense, the value creation 
principle plays a role of the benefit principle or even the economic allegiance theory in providing 
a broader rationale for a country to claim taxing right over international income. 
As a territorial source rule, however, can the place of economic activities and place of value 
creation be separate? In the case of profit derived from intangibles, group synergies and other 
mobile factors, determining the location of value creation is challenging. Capital importing 
countries will have different perspectives from capital exporting countries. “Production” countries 
may disagree from market countries about the value generated by customers.   
The value creation principle can be used as a negative source rule. The BEPS Project seems to rely 
on this principle to justify anti-abuse rules in the area of treaty shopping, permanent establishment 
and transfer pricing to deny taxing rights of jurisdictions where no value is created. This can be 
seen from the Tax Annex to the Saint Petersburg G20 Leaders Declaration (2013), which refers to 
this principle only in the context of these three areas.71 In the BEPS Package, the value creation 
principle was most relevant in Actions 8-10 on transfer pricing and Action 1 on the taxation of 
digital businesses based on the existence of a permanent establishment in an economic or digital 
sense. In effect, the value creation principle can be viewed as a negative source rule: a MNE’s 
profit should not be considered taxable in a country where there are no economic activities or value 
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creation. This is clear in the case of the revised transfer pricing rules which deny profit from being 
recognized in an intermediary country.  
3.1.4 What is the relationship to the arm’s length principle? 
What is the relationship between the value creation principle and the arm’s length principle? One 
view is that the value creation principle is a benchmark for testing the outcome of applying the 
arm’s length principle. Because of “the perceived emphasis on contractual allocations of functions, 
assets and risks” under the existing guidance, the arm’s length principle has been proven 
vulnerable to manipulation, leading to outcomes “which do not correspond to the value created 
through the underlying economic activity carried out by the members of an MNE group.” 72 
Therefore, the BEPS Action Plan required rewriting the guidance on the arm’s length principleby 
emphasizing substance, economic activities, value creation as opposed to self-serving contractual 
and legal arrangements. As such, the value creation principle’s  function is of “a corrective nature” 
– “a method for countering abusive constructions and not as an independent new standard.”73 
However, it is questionable whether the arm’s length principle was intended to be refereced to 
value principle. 
The flaws of the existing transfer price methods, which are already known, may be 
further burdened with flaws of the concept of value creation, of which there is only 
currently a limited awareness. Such a combination would give better results only if 
the arm’s length principle could be considered to be an indirect proxy for taxation 
where value is created, which would sometimes have to be corrected by direct 
observation of the created value. However, at least historically, this has not been 
the purpose of the arm’s length standard, which is intended to realize market 
neutrality between integrated and non-integrated businesses, but not necessarily in 
accordance with value creation.74 
Another view is that the BEPS Action Plan contemplated that the value creation principle can be 
broader than the arm’s length principle: “if transfer pricing risks remain after clarifying and 
strengthening the guidance, the BEPS Action Plan foresaw the possibility of introducing special 
measures either within or beyond the arm’s length principle.” (emphasis added)75 Presumably, the 
purpose of this approach is two-fold:  removing the unnecessary debate about consistency of the 
revised transfer pricing measures with the arm’s length principle; and setting the stage for 
innovative ways of better allocating global profits of MNEs among countries. This approach is 
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critical to the BEPS Project because some G20 countries have different views about the arm’s 
length principle.76 For example, China and India have taken a more holistic, global and substance-
over-form approach to applying the arm’s length principle.77  
The point where the arm’s length principle ends and the value creation principle continues is 
debatable. History suggests that there is a spectrum for implementing the arm’s length principle, 
ranging from comparable transactional pricing methods to transactional profit split methods. Even 
though the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines regard formulary apportionment method to be 
inconsistent with the arm’s length principle, opposing views exist.78  The Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) in EU79 and the proposed digital taxation measures in the UK move 
closer to formulary apportionment. The BEPS Project has authorized an expanded use of profit 
split method, especially in regard to allocating income arising from “synergistic benefits benefits 
of operating as a group” and “integrated global value chains.”80  It could be said that the transfer 
pricing regime under the value creation principle is moving closer to allocating an MNE’s profit 
on a global basis.  
3.2 Potential basis for a global corporate tax system 
“It is now widely taken as axiomatic that the existing international corporate tax system is based 
on the [value creation] principle” and there also appears to be “widespread agreement, at least 
amongst policymakers, that the system should be based on this principle.”81  Whether or not the 
value creation principle can be the basis for a new global approach to taxing MNEs may depend 
on several factors, including: (a) if the can be “operationalized” through legislation and 
administration on a consensus basis;82 and (b) if  the principle can garnish international support. 
And these are big “ifs”. 
3.2.1 “Operationalize” the value creation principle 
If the value creation principle can be translated into a source rule83 for allocating the taxing rights 
over MNEs’ profit among countries, it could replace the current residence-source paradigm.  
Assuming rules can be developed for global value chain analysis and determining where and how 
much value is created so that a MNE’s routine profits and residual profits can be allocated, there 
is no need for the tax system to adhere to the residence principle. MNEs would be taxed based on 
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the source of income as residence is not a meaningful nexus for tax jurisdiction. The activity of 
incorporation does not create any value on its own. Originally, corporate residence was generally 
tied to the place of value-creation activities, such as headquarter functions, place of carrying on 
business. Recently, the use of intermediaries incorporated in no-tax jurisdictions is not 
accompanied by such activities. The original assumption of the linkage between legal 
incorporation and economic presence is no longer valid. The CFC rules already remove the tax 
significance of corporate residence in the case of passive income. In countries adopting the 
territorial system of taxation, corporate profits are already taxed on a source basis.  
The value created in the country of corporate residence can be captured by the value creation 
principle. For capital exporting countries, the value creation activities can be entrepreneurial 
leadership, management and control, strategic planning, headquarter activities, providing capital, 
and other activities such as research and development. The value creation principle is capable of 
recognizing the profit derived from such activities. In many capital importing countries, MNEs 
use either local subsidiaries or permanent establishments to carry on the local business. As such, 
local residence and source of income give rise to the same level of taxing right and such right is 
captured by the value creation principle as well.  
If a global profit split method emerges in the future to take into account of sales of goods or 
services, the value creation principle would lead to a more equitable distribution of taxing rights 
among countries than the current system.    
3.2.2 Political acceptance 
The ambiguity of the value-creation principle may be its strength in the context of the BEPS 
Project. It is high-sounding and makes intuitive sense. It appears to be self-explanatory to 
politicians and laypersons: a foreign MNE owes tax in a country in which its value is created. To 
put it differently, an MNE should pay tax in a country if its global value chain includes that country. 
For example, if Starbucks sells a great deal of coffee in the UK, it should pay UK corporate tax. 
At a technical level, the ambiguity may make it easier to bring tax officials and other participants 
with varying degrees of tax expertise together to discuss highly complex tax rules as one can justify 
the changes on ground of advancing this ambiguous, but high-sounding goal.      
18 
 
Perhaps more profoundly, adopting the value creation principle suggests a desire for a more 
fundamental shift, at least on the part of some members of the G20, particularly BRICS countries, 
that were increasingly unsatisfied with the existing international tax system and wanted to have a 
voice in reshaping it.84 The traditional goal of international taxation to prevent double taxation can 
longer capture what these countries wish to achieve. They want to have a share of the global tax 
base that is greater than what is allocated to them under the existing system. They cannot achieve 
that goal merely through protecting the existing tax base by having better anti-avoidance measures. 
They can, however, have some leeway to “gain” additional tax base under the over-arching goal 
of taxation based on value creation. From BRICS countries’ perspective, transfer pricing and 
permanent establishment (for both traditional businesses and digital businesses) are key 
problematic areas. Empirical evidence on BEPS implementation practices of BRICS and other 
countries would likely show that they use BEPS to achieve both “base addition” and “base 
protection” objectives. One would imagine that that was intended from the beginning of the BEPS 
Project.  
As shown by the BEPS Project, commitment by political leaders of powerful countries is critical 
to launching the reform process and ensuring implementation. Political pressures may expedite the 
process and deliver outcomes that can be communicated to the general public. Moreover, value-
based discussions may lead to consensus. But, high-level consensus may camouflage the real 
differences among countries. For example, underneath the consensus on the value creation 
principle in the BEPS Project, OECD countries may wish to clarify and update the guidance on 
the application of the arm’s length principle, but non-OECD countries which regard transfer 
pricing as the most important aspect of the project, 85 may wish to go beyond the arm’s length 
principle and achieve a more “fair” allocation of the tax base. In terms of implementing the BEPS 
measures, EU countries have taken a different approach from the US. BRICS have embraced BEPS 
project and used it as an opportunity to embark on a new era of global tax governance.  
A more value-based approach, as opposed to a more rule-based approach, may be more realistic 
in the near future. The BEPS Project signaled that the process of reform has became more top-
down because G20, with its political clout, directed the BEPS Project and relied on the OECD for 
technical support. This is in contrast to the previous reform efforts led by the OECD, which follow 
a bottom-up approach and was driven by technocrats who were specialized in fiscal policy and 
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taxation.86 The BEPS project may also signal the end of American “constructive unilateralism” in 
setting international tax standard. 87 In the past, American “tax architects”, such as Seligman, 
Thomas and Carroll, were instrumental in shaping the international tax system88 and American tax 
policies have influenced other OECD countries and the work of OECD.  In the future, EU may 
take a different pathway, as is shown in the area of digital taxation. China and India have started 
to challenge the existing norms. 
The value creation principle may be broadly accepted as “fair”.  The notion of “fairness” played 
an important role in the BEPS Project.89 In launching the project, G20 Leaders declared that 
“cross-border tax evasion and avoidance undermine our public finances and our people's trust in 
the fairness of the tax system.”90 The notion of fairness may be the conceptual basis of the value 
creation principle. 91 For example, BRICS countries supported the value creation principle while 
stressing “the necessity of deepening international tax cooperation to build a fair and modern 
international tax system and boost the world’s economic growth” (emphasis added).92 BRICS 
countries also vowed to implement the “G20 tax agenda” and acknowledged their “common 
understanding that profits should be taxed in those jurisdictions where the activities generating 
those profits are performed.”93 The EU Commission has also noted that the value creation principle 
“is essential for a fair and effective taxation in the single market”.94 “The principle’s popular 
appeal perhaps can also be understood on the grounds that it appears to follow an intuitive 
understanding of fairness, along the lines of the benefits principle  that contributions to the cost of 
publicly-provided goods and services should be allocated based on the benefits derived from 
them.”95  
Many developing countries have joined the Inclusive Framework, thereby embracing the value 
creation principle. Some of these countries may suffer more harms from the BEPS than developed 
countries for several reasons. First, BEPS practices erode the corporate tax base of the source 
country and corporate tax generates a greater share of total tax revenues in developing countries, 
and ss such, the adverse impact of revenue loss is more severe.96  Second, developing countries’ 
tax laws are often less sophisticated and more susceptible to tax planning and the tax authorities 
lack resources to enforce complex rules, such as transfer pricing rules.97 An effective source-based 
taxation, which was intended, arguably, by the value creation principle, could permit developing 
countries to have a “fair” share of the MNE’s profit.98 It is also possible that as a result of the 
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BEPS Project, the effective increase in tax burdens will be greater in developed countries than in 
developing countries, which will make doing business in developing countries more attractive. 99 
Also, the value creation principle’s emphasis on actual economic activities  may lead some MNEs 
to relocate their value-creation activities physically to those developing countries that offer tax 
incentives.100 Therefore, even though the BEPS Project was launched by the world most powerful 
countries to counter tax planning by powerful MNEs and was not designed to help developing 
countries per se, the project has been accepted by developing countries. The value creation 
principle may have contributed to their acceptance.  
4 PROPOSING A GLOBAL PROFIT SPLIT APPROACH   
4.1 Tackling the Issue of Residual Profit  
Building on the momentum of the BEPS Project and the value creation principle, we propose to 
allocate MNEs’ profits according to a global profit split approach101 that is paired with a minimum 
standard for tax competition. We think this approach is politically feasible, technically viable, and 
conceptually aligned with the value creation principle.  
At the heart of the challenges in allocating profits of MNEs is income from intangibles, which can 
be conceptually understood as anything that is not tangible and has value. 102  The existing 
transactional residual profit split method separates “routine profit” derived from tangible assets 
and business functions and risks and “residual profit” attributable to intangibles.  BEPS Action 8-
10 Report states that: 
For intangibles, the guidance clarifies that legal ownership alone does not necessarily 
generate a right to all (or indeed any) of the return that is generated by the exploitation of 
the intangible. The group companies performing important functions, controlling 
economically significant risks and contributing assets, as determined through the accurate 
delineation of the actual transaction, will be entitled to an appropriate return reflecting the 
value of their contributions. Specific guidance will ensure that the analysis is not weakened 
by information asymmetries between the tax administration and the taxpayer in relation to 
hard-to-value intangibles, or by using special contractual relationships, such as a cost 
contribution arrangement.103  
Because the BEPS Project aimed to revise (not redesign) the transfer pricing methods to align 
profit for tax purposes with value creation, it suffers the flaws that plague the existing system. One 
flaw is the adherence to the separate entity principle (treating each member of an MNE group as a 
separate accounting unit), even though, in effect, the project has attempted to downplay the fiscal 
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impact of legal fictions.104 Another flaw is the transactional, comparability approach that is based 
on the facts and circumstances of each case. Even with the enhanced data and information reporting 
by MNEs, in addition to the practical complexity, conceptually, this approach does not treat the 
MNE’s global business as a unitary business. Instead, it continues to allocate profits between two 
parties to the transaction.  Further, there is no or inadequate allocation to sales or market as the 
method is supply-sided. The reform proposals canvassed below seek to address this core problem.   
4.2 The Global Profit Split Proposal 
The proposed global profit split or GPS approach modifies and extends the newly revised profit 
split method to the global profits of MNE groups. It would allocate global profits to the involved 
countries (where an MNE has economic and value-creation activities) in a two-step process: (1) 
Routine profits would be allocated according to value-creation activities and functions (in 
production countries) in a manner similar to the revised transfer pricing guidance; and (2) Residual 
profits would be allocated according to a formula consisted of tangible assets, payroll/workforce 
and sales. Once profit has been allocated to a jurisdiction, it is up to that jurisdiction to decide the 
rate of tax, including zero rate. This is consistent with BEPS Action 5 as the profits subject to the 
preferential taxation has substantial nexus to that jurisdiction.   
The success of the proposed approach will depend on a high-level consensus on the rules for 
determining global profits of an MNE group, the measurement and weight of apportionment 
factors, and a mechanism for resolving tax disputes. Compared to the alternative international tax 
reform proposals (see below), the GPS approach has some advantages.   
4.3 Alternative Proposals  
4.3.1 Destination-based Methods 
A destination-based corporate tax 105  would treat MNEs as unitary businesses rather than a 
constellation of separate legal entities.106 It would allocate residual profits based on where they 
sell their goods and services, that is, on a destination basis as opposed to the current origin basis 
(where activities and value creation take place). Propnents suggest that it is the future of the 
transfer pricing regime and corporate tax in general.107 The location of consumers is less mobile 
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than the location of property, employees, other elements of value creation. Three specific proposals 
are canvassed below: a sales-based formulary apportionment, residual profit allocation on a 
production line basis and residual profit allocation to marketing intangibles.  
4.3.1.1 Sales-based formulary apportionment 
A formulary apportionment method108 would determine a MNE’s profits for US tax purposes 
based on a fraction of the MNE’s worldwide income. The fraction would be the sum of (a) a fixed  
return (suggested to be 7.5%) on the MNE’s expenses in the United States (as a measurement of 
real economic activities) and (b) the share of its worldwide sales that occur in the United States.  
The single factor formulary apportionment based on sales is similar to the current method used by 
U.S. states in allocating national income across states.109 U.S. states have traditionally used a three-
factor formula (property, payroll and sales), but moved to the sole sales factor in order to attract 
corporate investment in assets and jobs and sales is less mobile compared to assets and payroll. 
According to the proponent, one of the advantages of this method is to “eliminate the tax incentive 
to shift income through legal and accounting devices, such as licenses of patents and other 
intangible property, to subsidiaries in zero-or low-tax countries” as “such shifting incentives often 
entail the movement of employees and plants.”110 Among the downsides of this method are its 
arbitrariness (e.g., fixing the rate of return for routine profits and using sales as the allocation key) 
and implementation challenges (such as defining the worldwide income, location of sales, and 
interactions between countries with different tax systems). 
4.3.1.2 Residual profit allocation on a product line basis 
Similar to the sales-based formulary apportionment method, this method assigns a normal rate of 
return to productive functions and allocate residual profit to the location of sales. But, proponents 
of this method attempt to keep this method in the existing arm’s length transfer pricing regime by 
avoiding a formulary apportionment method. Instead, the proposed method deems the country in 
which sales take place to be an “entrepreneurial affiliate” with respect to local market sales and 
ascribes all non-routine profits to that deemed affiliate.111 In other words, other entrepreneurial 
functions, such as manufacturing, R&D, services, and marketing receive routine profits only.  In 
other words, instead of allocating residual profit to the affiliate that is the owner or performs 
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DEMPE [development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles] 
functions, the residual profit is allocated to affiliates in the market jurisdictions.  
Further, this proposed method requires a product line and country by country determination: gross 
revenues would be computed by country and by product using some concept of place of supply or 
destination and global costs would be measured at a product line level and then either traced or 
apportioned to revenues from specific countries. Because economic activities and value creation 
activities are rewarded with routine profits, this method reduces the uncertainty by attributing 
residual profit to the market jurisdiction using methods that are familiar under the existing transfer 
pricing regime.         
4.3.1.3 Residual profit allocation to marketing intangibles 
This method can be viewed as a derivative of the above destination-based residual profit allocation 
method. It goes one step further by singling out marketing intangibles. It would assign residual 
profits to the market jurisdiction to the extent that they are derived from marketing intangibles and 
leave residual profit from other intangibles to be assigned according to general transfer pricing 
principles.112   
4.3.2 Alternative minimum tax on global profits 
Without changing the existing paradigm of taxing MNEs on the basis of residence and source of 
income, proposals of alternative minimum tax aim at ensuring that MNEs’ profits are taxed at a 
minimal level. Earlier proposals by American scholars113 and the Obama Administration in the 
2016 draft budget114 sought to strengthen residence-based taxation of U.S. based MNEs on a 
worldwide basis by eliminating deferral of US tax. The basic thinking is similar to that behind the 
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules in respect of foreign passive income. The 2017 US Tax 
Reform extended the CFC regime to foreign income from intangibles under the GILTI (global 
intangible low-taxed income) rules.115 Both the US CFC rules and GILTI rules ensure the targeted 
foreign income is taxed, at a minimum, at the US rate (which is half of the standard corporate tax 
rate for GILTI).116 CFC rules and GILTI rules are outbound rules as they target income derived 
from foreign investment and activities. 
24 
 
The 2017 US Tax Reform also introduced an inbound minimum tax in the form of BEAT (base 
erosion anti-abuse tax).117 Recently, scholars suggest introducing a minimum effective tax for 
MNEs by pairing the inbound and outbound minimum taxes (i.e. BEAT plus CFC and GILTI)118 
or introducing a global general anti-avoidance rule mandating a minimum global tax rate.119   
The minimum tax approach has the advantage of building on the momentum of the BEPS Project 
in tackling the problem of stateless income. It requires countries to agree to the minimum effective 
tax rate and foregoing the use of tax incentives to attract substantive foreign investment.  The latter 
requirement may be perceived as encroaching tax sovereignty in that their tax incentive policies 
would be rendered ineffective. To implement the proposal, countries would need to have a 
benchmark corporate tax system and use the minimum tax as an alternative system. An advantage 
of the proposal is that the existing international tax rules would continue and the minimum tax 
would not replace it, but only backstop it.   
4.3.3 Reversing the residence-source paradigm  
Under the current international tax paradigm, passive income is taxed primarily in the residence 
country and active income is taxed primarily in the source country. “Most of the current issues can 
be solved by taxing passive income primarily at source and active income primarily at 
residence.”120 This proposal seeks to tackle both the corporate tax avoidance issue and personal 
tax evasion problems. The assumption is that individuals earning passive income reside in a small 
number of high-income countries: the US, EU countries and Japan. If the source country imposes 
withholding tax on passive income, it would render the channeling of such income through 
intermediaries in tax havens meaningless (for tax purposes). There is no need for residence 
countries to get cooperation from tax haven jurisdictions.  
As to active income, it should be taxed in the residence country. According to the proponents of 
this method, since 90% of large MNEs are headquartered (resident) in G20 countries, if these 
countries tax their MNEs’ global profit on a current basis (which is opposite to the current 
territorial system), it would render tax planning practices to erode source countries’ tax ineffective. 
This proposal is like the minimum tax proposal in that all business profits are subject to tax under 
a CFC-like regime. In other words, CFC rules would be extended to global profits of MNEs 
headquartered in G20 countries.  
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Proponents of the reverse paradigm approach did not spell out the details on the implementation. 
A great deal of faith was placed on the U.S. “constructive unilateralism”,121 that is the United 
States leads and other countries would follow. They acknowledge: 
It is impossible to predict what will happen, but the history [in the US to deal with 
deferral] suggests that there is a good chance that other G20 countries will follow 
us if we abolish deferral at a lower rate.  If that happens, all the usual objections to 
worldwide taxation (competitiveness, inversions, and the various neutralities) lose 
their force. We do not think there is a significant risk involved in this move, and 
the potential upside is quite large.122 
4.3.4 The CCCTB - Multi-factor Formulary apportionment 
The CCCTB (common consolidated corporate tax base) proposed by the European Commission 
in 2016123 is a multi-factor formulary apportionment regime. Under the CCCTB, the profit of all 
entities being part of corporate group above a specified threshold (750 million Euros) turnover 
would be computed under harmonized rules and the consolidated profits (and losses) would be 
apportioned to each involved country according to a formula composed of fixed assets, 
payroll/workforce and sales.124 The EU also proposed that the CCCTB would apply to taxing 
digital companies that125 have a “digital presence” in a EU member scountry.126   
Unlike the destination-based formulary apportionment, the CCCTB applies to the entire group 
profits, not just residual profits. By default, income derived from intangibles would be allocated 
to countries based on the three factor, thereby favouring countries where productive activities and 
sales take place, not where high-value intangibles are created.  The required harmonization of rules 
on computing profits and agreement on the measurement of the allocation factors have made it 
difficult for the adoption of the CCCTB in the EU.   
4.4 A Global Profit Split Approach for the 21st Century 
Compared to the existing tax paradigm for taxing MNEs and the altnerative proposals, we suggest 
that the proposed global profit split or GPS approach has some advantages. It is more aligned with 




4.4.1 Consistency with the value creation principle 
In spite of the drawbacks canvassed in Part 2 above, the value creation principle could be viewed 
as the first global tax principle. The proposed GPS approach is consistent with this principle.  
Under this approach, the global business profit of MNEs is treated as the total taxable income (or 
value) and is allocated to the involved jurisdictions where value is created. As such, no profit 
would be allocated to pure intermediary jurisdictions. It differs from the existing transfer pricing 
regime that fragmentizes the global profit into bits that can be measured by national tax laws, 
leaving opportunities for some of the bits be allocated to intermediary jurisdictions.   
Moreover, the proposed GPS approach is substance-based. Intra-group contractual arrangements 
and the use of legal fictions are not relevant, and only value-creating activities and functions are 
taken into account.  It recognizes value creation activities taken place in production countries, 
market countries as well as intangible-creation (or DEMPE) countries. As such, profit arising from 
global value chains is captured and allocated to the countries involved in the chains. As compared 
to the existing system which allows MNEs’ residual profit to low-tax intermediary jurisdictions127 
the proposed GPS approach as the advantage of eliminating the attractiveness of channeling profits 
to such jurisdictions.128 
It can be argued that the proposed GPS approach is more aligned with the business realities. The 
business of MNEs are globally integrated, and the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The 
business is integrated when interdependent basic operations are carried on to a substantial extent 
in different jurisdictions by the branches or subsidiaries that constitute the controlled enterprise. 
The GPS approach recognizes this changed economic reality and can fairly allocate the residual 
profit of an MNE to all participants in an integrated business. It is thus superior to existing 
methods, which either cannot account for residual profit (in the case of transactional methods) or 
cannot fairly allocate it.129 
Compared to the destination based proposals, the GPS approach recognizes value created in both 
production jurisdictions, DEMPE jurisdictions and market jurisdictions and is thus more aligned 
with the value creation principle. It is similar to the sales-based formulary apportionment proposal 
and the CCCTB approach by using formulary method to allocate MNEs’ global profit. It differs 
from the global minimum tax proposal by permitting countries to continue to operate preferential 
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tax regimes as long as they are constrained to the profits that are allocated to them. In other words, 
the proposed global profit split method ,  
4.4.2 Evolutionary nature 
The GPS approach represents a more “natural” evolution from the existing transactional profit split 
method and the existing paradigm of taxing MNEs.  As a “globalized” profit split method, the GPS 
continues the tradition of separating routine profits and residual profits. It can be viewed as a 
logical addition to the toolbox used to give meaning to the arm’s length principle.130 In other 
words, GPS is not a radical departure from the arm’s-length principle, but rather a natural 
development in its evolution. The GPS approach can also be viewed as a logical global expansion 
of the traditional formulary apportionment methods used by sub-national governments in Canada 
and the United States or the globalization of the EU CCCTB mechanism.131 
The GPS is not a departure from the theoretical underpinnings of the existing international tax 
system, that is the economic allegiance theory, tax benefit theory or tax neutrality theory. It 
strengthens tax sovereignty by permitting countries to choose their tax rates (including zero rate) 
for profit allocated to them. To the extent the GPS approach renders corporate residence redundant 
as a basis for taxing MNEs’ income, the GPS can be viewed as protecting the tax base of countries 
where value is created and residence status per se produces no value. Therefore, the GPS represents 
incremental changes to the existing system which reflects the aphorism natura non facit saltum—
nature makes no sudden leaps.132  
It is true that the OECD has insisted that a “global formulary apportionment” using predetermined 
formulae is inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. 133  However, the BEPS Project has 
signaled greater use of profit split analyses. The OECD Revised Guidance on the Application of 
the Transactional Profit Split Method – BEPS Action 10 (July 2018 ), while retaining the rhetoric 
of transactional approach, states that profit split may be the most appropriate method in the 
presence of one or more of the following indicators: each party makes unique and valuable 
contributions;  the business operations are highly integrated; or the parties share the assumption of 
economically significant risks, or separately assume closely-related risks. The profit splitting 
factors assets, capital, time spent or headcounts, data on which can be found in the CbCR filings.   
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4.4.3 Technical feasibility 
The GPS approach is technically feasible owing to the practical experience in applying profit split 
method, national experience with formulary apportionment, and recent reform initiatives. In 
practice, profit split methods are “routinely accepted by taxpayers and tax authorities alike”, and 
“have become the standard method” in certain industries, such as global trading.134 The increased 
integration of global business operations “makes the use of profit splits unavoidable.”135  
More importantly, OECD countries are taking action that defies the OECD’s rhetorical insistence 
that formulary apportionment is against the arm’s length principle. EU countries follow the arm’s 
length principle in their domestic laws and tax treaties but may soon adopt the CCCTB regime. 
Even if the CCCTB were not adopted in the near future, it has not been rejected on the ground of 
violating the arm’s length principle. The enhanced global value chain analysis following the BEPS 
Project is viewed as bridging the CCCTB and the arm’s length principle.136  
Through the GILTI, FDII and BEAT rules, the United States effectively adopted a “50-50 global 
profit-split mechanisms in the 2017 Tax Reform: 137  
On the one hand, these provisions are not specifically framed in terms of exceptions to the 
arm’s length principle or the definition of “intangibles” of the OECD Guidelines, embodied 
in Section 482 of the US Internal Revenue Code. On the other hand, they certainly reflect 
a US Congressional conclusion that the existing transfer pricing and related principles of 
US law are not, on their own, sufficient to protect the US tax base from aggressive effective 
tax rate planning strategies … of MNEs. These mechanisms could be viewed as introducing 
an underlying “intangible” in the form of a price to be paid for access to the US 
marketplace. 138 
Non-OECD countries have been less dogmatic about the arm’s length principle in general. For 
example, China has permitted the use of any “reasonable method” in determining the appropriate 
amount of profit of an MNE for Chinese tax purposes, including a share of global profit.139 China, 
India and Brazil declared in the UN Manual on Transfer Pricing that they do not fully accept the 
OECD approaches to transfer pricing140 They are determined “to shake up the international tax 
system to assert very strongly the importance of the corporate income tax as a source tax and not 
to give up on it” and the focus has mainly been on transfer pricing. 141 These countries and 




The CbCR, Multilateral Instrument and dispute resolution mechanisms introduced by the BEPS 
Project are expected to help countries implement the GPS approach. Even if developing countries 
lack capacity to administer the formulary apportionment regime, they would not lose any existing 
tax base because of routine profits would be allocated to production activities. 
4.4.4 Political feasibility 
The strongest argument in favor of the GPS approach over the alternative proposals is the political 
feasibility. We can assume that the world has four types of countries in terms of value creation: 
production countries that produce goods and services, market countries where goods and services 
are sold; DEMPE countries where intangibles are created, and tax haven countries that are 
intermediary jurisdictions. The proposed GPS approach has a better chance of being perceived to 
be fair by all countries except tax havens. Production countries would have a tax base reflecting a 
routine return on productive activities as well as a share of residual profit attributable to productive 
factors (assets and people). DEMPE countries would receive a share of global profit based on 
assets and payroll. Market countries would have a tax base reflecting a share of residual profit 
based on sales, which is better than the existing system under which they are not entitled to sharing 
the residual profit. Tax haven jurisdictions have been the target of harmful tax practices initiatives 
and the BEPS Project and will not receive any share of global profit unless value-creation activities 
occur there. Non-tax haven countries would be expected to continue to have a united front in 
preventing profit shifting to tax havens. 
In the foreseeable future, tax policies will continue to reflect the fiscal choices of each sovereign 
state. The proposed GPS approach respects tax sovereignty by allowing countries to continue to 
decide if they want to engage in tax competition. Developing countries that prefer to use tax 
incentives to attract direct foreign investment would likely support such approach. Capital 
exporting countries can continue to use anti-abuse regimes to ensure that they can tax their share 
of the global profit (as determined under the GPS). 
More importantly, perhaps, the GPS approach can lead to a more equitable outcome for developing 
countries which are production countries and/or market countries, but may have limited resources 
to asses MNEs. By allocating global profits according to a formula consisted of tangible assets, 
payroll/workforce and sales, the GPS approach can help reduce the erosion of source-based 
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taxation in developing countries. It might be possible that a developing country’s share is 
established under the GPS approach without involving much administrative resources of the 
developing country. The GPS approach would be simpler than the existing transfer pricing regime. 
In summary, the proposed GPS approach enjoys several advantages over the existing system for 
allocating international income. The GPS would be more equitable in allocating income among 
jurisdictions and be more consistent with both economic theory and the economic reality of how 
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